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Introduction
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect union… do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”1 When the words of the
United States Constitution were originally written in 1787, they were meant to establish a newer,
working, unified American government; they delegated certain powers and responsibilities to
each of the three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. While the legislative branch,
made up of Congress and the House of Representatives, is responsible for creating and passing
legislature, it is the judicial branch’s responsibility to ensure that legislature is upheld and, in
certain cases, constitutional.2 The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the
country, as mandated by the Constitution, with the utmost authority on all cases concerning
national constitutionality, although their jurisdiction only extends to certain types of cases,
including the following: “Controversies between two or more States; between a State and
Citizens of another State; [and] between Citizens of different State.”3 The judicial power of the
Supreme Court “extend[s] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, [and]
the Laws of the United States,’ allowing them to render appellate or original decisions on all
cases within their jurisdiction concerning the constitutionality of national legislation, state court
decisions, and appellate court decisions.4
Thus the Supreme Court has the responsibility to understand and interpret the laws and
Constitution of the United States as applies to cases; in Marbury v. Madison, this power of the
Supreme Court was established as both rule and precedent.5 Often in cases before the Supreme
Court, the justices must decide whether a case decision or law is upheld by the Constitution.
1

U.S. Const.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
3
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
4
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
5
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
2
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However, the overall understanding and interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court
has changed as often as the Chief Justices of the Court. Each Supreme Court Justice, as well as
all lower federal judges, has an individual idea of how to interpret the Constitution; this
particular difference of ideas and methods allows for any two judges applying the Constitution to
the same legal issue to likely reach different conclusions.6 These discrepancies in the way that
justices interpret the Constitution are highly influenced by the language utilized in these historic
legal documents. Although legal language, by itself, can be difficult to fully comprehend, the
language in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights is especially ambiguous, allowing for multiple
possible interpretations and understandings of the real meaning of the governing documents.
This linguistic ambiguity, whether purposeful or accidental, is one reason for so much variation
in the past and current understandings of the Constitution.

Lexical (Semantic) Ambiguity
Linguistic ambiguity and vagueness in legal documents can be attributed to several
factors; in the United States Constitution, the two most likely culprits of ambiguity are lexical
(semantic) and syntactic. The first, lexical ambiguity, addresses the differences in meanings of
individual words (while semantic ambiguity is related, it focuses on the meanings of words
within certain contexts).7 In addition, certain words can even be lexically or semantically vague,
as opposed to ambiguous; with ambiguity, a word might have more than one possible meaning
depending on its use, but with vagueness, a word has only one real meaning, but is used in a
context that makes its purpose unclear.8 Lexical ambiguity presupposes that no meaning of a
word is necessarily incorrect, as many words have developed multiple meanings over the history
6

Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 108.
Timothy A. O. Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 50.
8
Endicott, Vagueness in Law, p. 54.
7
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of the English language; instead, a word in a certain context might only have one logical
meaning.9 For example, the word “jurisdiction” has the following definitions in two separate
lexicons:
jurisdiction, n: 1. a government’s general power to exercise authority over all persons
and things within its territory; 2. a court’s power to decide a case or issue a
decree; 3. a geographic area within which political or judicial authority
may be exercised; 4. a political or judicial subdivision within such an
area.10
jurisdiction, n: the power to act juridically.11
However, within the context of Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, the meaning of
“jurisdiction” in context might mean the types of decisions that the Supreme Court has power
over (original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction).12 Therefore, the literal, “plain” meaning of a
word can be different from two meanings of that word in different respective contexts, even
though all of the meanings are accurate for that word.13 This ability for any word to convey
different meanings in specific contexts, regardless of the literal, detached meaning of that word,
greatly affects the linguistic ambiguity of the Constitution.

Syntactic (Phrasal) Ambiguity
Syntactic vagueness and ambiguity have a certain amount of bearing on Constitutional
ambiguity as well, as the combination of lexically ambiguous or vague words into ambiguous or
vague phrases and sentences can only cause more complexities when it comes to understanding
9

Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 114.
th
Black’s Law Dictionary, ed. Bryan A. Garner, 9 ed., (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 2009), p. 927-928.
11
nd
Christine Rossini, English as a Legal Language, 2 ed., (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 35.
12
U.S. Const. art III, § 2.
13
Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 73-74.

10
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the overall meaning. Vagueness in phrases is a more commonplace factor of linguistic
ambiguity, possibly more so than lexical ambiguity; even if a phrase is clear in one context, it
may be unclear when given a slightly different context.14 According to one approach, a phrase
can be analyzed by both content and force: while the force of the phrase may change (perhaps
from a declarative statement to an imperative statement), the content of the phrase remains the
same.15 However, it is also a possibility that a change in the force of a phrase could in fact
change the content of the phrase, since some words have different associations within different
types of phrases (for example, absolute words such as “no” or “all” have far different meanings
in rules than they do in descriptive statements).16 Although the concept of phrasal vagueness
might be more of a straightforward theoretical explanation than that of lexical ambiguity, the
effects of this type of linguistic ambiguity are no less complex. The possible interpretations that
arise from phrasal and syntactic vagueness, especially in the context of the Constitution, can
result in a varying number of opinions on certain laws.

Interpretations of Legal Linguistic Ambiguity
Vagueness of language, although not always evident, is present within the Constitution.
Although it is inherent in the language used, the linguistic ambiguity does not really present itself
until ambiguity of meaning (or variance of interpretation based on those meanings) is sought.
The Constitution no longer is thought of as one definite entity anymore; instead, it can be
thought of as “words of the document as those words were understood at the time of enactment”
or “ideal justice” or “the traditions and collection conscience of [the American] people.”17

14

Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 71.
Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 71-72.
16
Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 72.
17
Steven D. Smith, “Law as Language?”, Mercer Law Review, 63 Mercer L. Rev. 891 (2012), p. 895.
15
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The linguistic ambiguity of the Constitution opens the law to any number of possible
interpretations, especially by the Supreme Court. Although judicial interpretations can vary
anywhere on the spectrum from “obviously right” to “inventive,” most interpretations follow
certain types of methods.18 Many common constitutional interpretations are just a reformulation
of a rule by a justice, or just new answers to certain legal questions; however, there are more
specific means by which to determine constitutional meaning.19 There are certain accepted
standards by which to interpret ambiguity in the Constitution: linguistic interpretation (based on
the meaning of words); logical interpretation (which is systematic); historical interpretation
(according to historical origins); and teleological interpretation (according to the purpose of
law).20
The purpose of the different types of interpretations is for a judge or court to reach either
objective or subjective correctness in constitutional interpretation; objectivity “refers to getting
the meaning right,” yet it is usually influenced by the subjectivity of consensus.21 Correctness of
meaning, especially among the Supreme Court justices, often relies on consensus of meaning,
through agreement one of several factors: the correct interpretation; the correct authority to refer
to; or the correct decision-procedure to use.22 Yet preference for objectivity or subjectivity is not
the true reason for judicial interpretation. The court’s responsibility is towards the “wise
development of the law” through its attempts to give effect to the law; the linguistic ambiguity of
the Constitution allows for this development through judicial interpretation and reasoning.23

18

Endicott, Vagueness in Law, p. 179.
Endicott, Vagueness in Law, p. 179.
20
Olga Burukina, “Legal Language: A Realm of Contradictions”, Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice,
vol. 4 (New York: Addleton Academic Publishers, 2012), p. 715.
21
Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 65.
22
Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 65.
23
Endicott, Vagueness in Law, p. 183.
19
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Examples of Linguistic Ambiguity within the Constitution and its Amendments
Although the whole of the Constitution seems to be prone to varying interpretations by
different justices, certain sections of both that particular document as well as its amendments are
more likely to be highly debated within cases, all of which is evidence of linguistic ambiguity.
Well-known within both the court system as well as the public sphere, the following excerpts
from the Constitution and the Bill of Rights have been the subject of much judicial interpretation
by the Supreme Court:
Article III, Section 2:
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;… to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of
another State; between Citizens of different States…”24
Amendment I:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.”25
Amendment XIV, Section 1:
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”26
Amendment XV, Section 1:
24

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
U.S. Const. amend. I.
26
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
25
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“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”27
Although these particular parts of the Constitution do not outwardly seem as though they are
necessarily ambiguous or open to interpretation, their meanings can be construed differently
based on the situations in which they are being analyzed. In fact, the linguistically open nature of
these two documents, including the excerpts listed above, effectually means that neither truly
“govern[s] us” anymore; since a variety of interpretations of the laws within these governing
documents are possible, there are no longer any structured, certain rules by which case outcomes
are decided, to the point “that when people refer to the Constitution, they mean very different
things.”28 Such ambiguity in defining and interpreting the law in the Constitution has become
evident through the document’s history, as evidenced by all Supreme and federal court cases
addressing any issue of constitutionality.

Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Ambiguity
Although any person is free to read the Constitution and interpret the meaning of its
contents for themselves, the Supreme Court Justices have the highest authority to constitutional
interpretations when it comes to legislation as involved in lower court decisions. Yet their
common role in the United States’ government does not ensure that each justice shares the same
opinion on interpretation as any other. For each Supreme Court justice considering a case, there
must be one right answer, according to the interpretation of the Constitution by that justice; since
this “right” answer will be subjective to the logic and morals of that justice’s personal

27
28

U.S. Const. amend XV, § 1.
Smith, “Law as Language?”, p. 895.
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interpretation, it must vary, whether slightly or drastically, from the “right’ answers of those
other justices.29 In addition, each justice may strive for a certain outcome in the case, believing it
to be the most correct interpretation of the law in the Constitution and of the facts of the case.30
Yet with a panel of judges, such as with the Supreme Court, there is a need to reach a majority
vote in favor of one or another outcome; so contrary to the idea described above (that a justice
will vote for his “right” answer outcome), a justice may render an opinion or vote that is contrary
to their own interpretation, solely for the benefit of ensuring the case is decided in the majority.31
The four excerpts from the Constitution that are listed earlier have been exceptionally
ambiguous for Supreme Court justices, as they are often interpreted somewhere along a wide
spectrum of “right” answers. For each excerpt listed above, there are a certain number of
important, detailed Supreme Court cases that have resulted in decisions that rely on various
interpretations of that portion of the Constitution; without linguistic ambiguity within the
Constitution, the following variety of case decisions could not be possible.

Article III, Section 2:
Several Supreme Court cases have been concerned with the establishment of
jurisprudence for certain courts within the United States court system. With the separation of
individual state court systems from federal court systems, many issues arise over whether or not
a certain court has jurisdiction over a case.32

29

Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 109.
Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 113.
31
Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, p. 114.
32
Richard A. Leiter and Roy M. Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases: The Most Influential Decisions of the
nd
Supreme Court of the United States, 2 ed., vol. 2 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2012), p. 648.
30
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In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816), the issue was whether or not the Supreme Court, in
cases involving the federal Constitution, had appellate jurisdiction over the highest state courts.33
In this case, the Supreme Court justices decided that the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which allowed for U.S. Supreme Court review of final state court decisions when such decisions
concerned the federal Constitution, laws and treaties, was in fact constitutional; Section 2 of
Article III in the federal Constitution states that the Supreme Court jurisdiction “extend[s] to all
Cases… arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made…
under their Authority.”34 This particular panel of justices seemed to interpret the Constitution
rather as logical and linguistically explicit; rather than interpreting the words and syntax of this
law, the justices employed the plain meaning of the law.
In the case of Wayman v. Southard (1825), the issue presented to the Supreme Court
concerns federal courts within states, and whether those courts should have to apply the laws
followed by the respective states in which they are located.35 The Supreme Court upheld the
Congress’ ability to delegate power to the federal courts, even over the laws of the state in which
the federal court is located.36 The justices of the Supreme Court, in this case, approached the
legislature’s delegation of jurisdictional power as rather straightforward; the Congress enables
the federal courts to have a certain power within their jurisdiction, and state legislation cannot
refute that power.
In the case of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins (1938), the issue addressed is whether
federal or state law applies in a case before a federal court when the plaintiff and defendant are

33

Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 653-654.
U.S. Const. art. III, §2.
35
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 657.
36
Leiter and Merksy, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 657.
34
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citizens of different states.37 On this matter, the court decided that the law of the state where an
incident (in this case, an accident) occurred should take precedent over federal law, meaning the
only applicable laws in this particular situation were state laws.38 In this particular instance, the
majority of the Supreme Court chose to take the phrases “between Citizens of different States”
and “under… the Laws of the United States” in Article III, Section 3 as being somewhat
ambiguous; although the federal courts certainly had jurisdiction over this case, the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of state laws over federal laws in this instance. Due to lexical ambiguity, the
majority of the justices could assume that, if there was any absence of a federal statute, the state
statute could take precedence in any federal jurisdiction.

Amendment I:
The first amendment addresses the freedom of the press, among others freedoms of
American citizens. Federal regulation of the press has always been under scrutiny, and within the
cases detailed below, that attempt at regulation continues to be questioned.
In the case of Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), the Supreme Court decided on the issue of
whether or not a local city government could require a person to receive written permission from
a city manager to distribute any kind of literature.39 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
decided that this was in fact an unconstitutional statute. 40 The words of Amendment I states that
“Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;” although the
legislature mentioned in the Constitution is “Congress,” the first amendment has been extended
to apply to all forms of government, rendering the written approval statute of the City of Griffin

37

Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 660.
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 661.
39
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 747.
40
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 747-748.
38
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unconstitutional.41 There is no contemplation of ambiguity in this matter; the justices clearly take
the word “no” as an absolute and in no way open to interpretation.
In the case of New York Times Company v. United States (1971), the situation arose
during the Nixon administration, and addressed the issue of whether or not his administration
violated the First Amendment in trying to prevent publication of “classified” information.42 The
majority of the Supreme Court held that the action of the Nixon administration had indeed been
unconstitutional; however, each concurring justice filed his or her own opinion, since each had
interpreted the language of the First Amendment differently.43 The Nixon administration claimed
that the government could have been in imminent danger if the press had released the
“classified” information; yet the majority of the court justices believed that this “danger” was
evident enough to overcome the first amendment freedom of press.44 Clearly, in this later case,
the justices were more likely to acknowledge the possible ambiguity (and therefore multiple
interpretations) of the words and phrases within the First Amendment as it concerns matters of
national security.

Amendment XIV, Section 1:
The Fourteenth Amendment is imperative to ensuring the rights of all those who are
determined to be citizens of the United States are recognized as such; however, the interpretation
of this particular clause of the Constitution does not always ensure such a result. Since the
creation of this amendment, there have been several cases that have taken the first section to be

41

U.S. Const. amend. I
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 747-748.
42
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 752.
43
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 752-753.
44
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 752-753.
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somewhat linguistically ambiguous, and this has resulted in several case decisions that, upon first
reading, don’t seem to have interpreted the correct meaning of the law.
In Hurtado v. People of the State of California (1884), the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether or not the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires indictment
by a grand jury in a state criminal prosecution; in this particular case, the Supreme Court decided
against the accused, stating that “due process” did not include indictment by a grand jury within
a state prosecution.45 The opinion of the court seems to be a word-for-word interpretation of the
due process clause; since there is no mention of a “grand jury indictment” within the due process
clause, the justices took the clause to have no ambiguity, either lexically or syntactically.46
In the case of Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1905), the issue at hand was
whether or not, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an individual has the
right to be exempted from a state law requiring vaccination for a disease.47 The Supreme Court
found the state law for mandatory vaccination to be constitutional and not in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 The due process clause only lists the deprivation
of life, liberty, or property as requiring due process of law; in this case, the majority of the
justices decided that the lexically ambiguous word “liberty” did not encompass exemptions that
could risk the welfare of the state.49 Instead, the Court supported the state’s authority to use
“police power” in this instance, for the common good of all the state citizens.50
In the famous case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant could be indefinitely detained without basic

45

Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 389.
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 389-390.
47
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 397.
48
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 398.
49
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.
50
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 398.
46
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due process rights.51 The Supreme Court found in favor of the detainee, agreeing that a detainee
had basic due process rights, such as the right to counsel and the right to state his plea before “a
neutral decision maker,” with could be either a court or a military tribunal.52 The majority
opinion of the court seems to use a literal interpretation of the clause, rather than delving into its
ambiguity; since the Fourteenth amendment mentions its applicability to all citizens of the
United States, and since Hamdi was a citizen, he had access to basic due process rights.53

Amendment XV, Section 1:
The Fifteenth Amendment, in the past century, had been the subject of many of the most
controversial cases; since it concerns the abridging of rights based on “race, color, or previous
condition of servitude,” it has been the law under argument for many of the civil rights cases in
history.54 Unfortunately, this first section of the Fifteenth Amendment is lexically and
syntactically ambiguous enough that it has been open to a variety of interpretations in the past.
In the controversial case of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether or not separate but equal accommodations in interstate commerce, based on
race, were in fact constitutional.55 In an almost unanimous majority opinion, the Supreme Court
found that the separation of person by race was in fact constitutional, as it did not degrade or
make any race inferior to the other, and it did not destroy the legal equality of any race.56 This
seems to clearly be an interpretation utilized in order to achieve a certain outcome, rather than an
interpretation based on logic; the ambiguity of the word “abridged” it fully taken advantage of,

51

Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 492.
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 493.
53
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.
54
U.S. Const. amend. XV, §1.
55
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 67.
56
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 68.
52
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and is interpreted in favor of segregation. (N.B.: The decision in Plessy v. Ferguson was later
overturned in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954); in addition to utilizing
the linguistic ambiguity of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Justices implemented the use of
scientific research and studies to reach their decision in this case.57 Although linguistic ambiguity
is a major factor in constitutional interpretation, there are other major factors that have influence
as well.)
In the case of Lane v. Wilson (1939), the Supreme Court was again faced with an issue
from Oklahoma; in this instance, the constitutionality of the voter registration law of 1916, which
denied qualified citizens the right to vote, was called into question.58 The majority of the court
was of the opinion that the law, which gave voting rights to Caucasian citizens but not
necessarily to African American citizens, was inherently unconstitutional.59 The justices, again,
took the plain meaning of the phrase “citizens of the United States” within the Fifteenth
Amendment to be all citizens, and they did not allow for any ambiguity about the terms of
“infringe” or “abridge”.60

Public Interpretation of Constitutional Ambiguity
The Justices of the Supreme Court are responsible for interpreting the meanings of all the
laws within the Constitution and for applying those interpretations to cases in which
constitutionality of a statute is called into question; however, they are not the only people to
whom the Constitution is available for interpretation. The interpretation of the Constitution by
lay persons, or regular citizens of the United States without any legal training, can often lead to
57

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
ed. Ernest H. Schopler, 98 L ed. (Rochester: Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1954), p. 873-881.
58
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 86.
59
Leiter and Mersky, Landmark Supreme Court Cases, p. 86.
60
U.S. Const. amend. XV, §1.
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similar opinions as those reached by legal authorities. Regardless of whether a person has the
ability to identify ambiguous lexicon or syntax, he is still able to realize that an interpretation,
while not necessarily logical, is entirely possible if the language allows for it.
In a survey conducted within a group of five male and female college students, none of
whom have attended law school or received any formal legal training, four different questions
were asked, each addressing a different part of the United States Constitution.61 These four
questions addressed the following four different sections of the Constitution: Article III, Section
2; the First Amendment; Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and Section 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment.62 Each of the four questions had three to four possible responses; each of these
responses was a Supreme-Court-decision-based interpretation of the question’s respective
section of the Constitution.63 Each of these Supreme Court case interpretations is slightly
different from the others; some have never been overturned, while others have been struck down
as unconstitutional. Each person surveyed was able to choose multiple answers, under the
request that they choose only answers which they thought were logically sound.64
For the questions on Article III, Section 2 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
those persons surveyed were likely to only choose one answer, although all options were
available.65 For the question on the Fourteenth Amendment, eighty percent of all those surveyed
chose the interpretation that “all citizens of the United States are entitled to due process of law,
with no exceptions;” however, twenty percent of those surveyed concluded that “citizens of the
United States are entitled to due process of law, but only on a case-by-case basis,” and a separate

61

Christina J. Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey for undergraduate thesis, University of
Tennessee, 2014).
62
Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
63
Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
64
Banfield, “interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
65
Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
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twenty percent also concluded that “citizens of the United States are entitled to due process of
law, but this privilege could be met by either the judicial branch or military tribunals, depending
on the situation.”66 While one answer seemed to be the most common interpretation, it was by no
means the only logical one; the ambiguity of the due process clause was noticed by at least
twenty percent of those surveyed. Yet with the question on Section 2 of Article III, all of those
surveyed gave exactly one answer.67 Sixty percent of those surveyed concluded that “the federal
courts of the United States only have jurisdiction over appeals of State court cases that deal with
matters specified in the Constitution;” twenty percent decided that “the federal courts must apply
the common laws of their respective States into their own proceedings in all cases;” and the
remaining twenty percent interpreted the section to mean that “the federal courts must apply
constitutional values, the laws of the United States, and treaties when they are brought cases…
[and] no mention of state law is given… credit to be applied preceding the overarching laws of
the federal Constitution.”68 While the majority of those surveyed could only logically interpret
the law in one manner, others were able to utilize the available language ambiguity to logically
decide upon a different interpretation.
The results of the question on Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment are most similar to
those of the Fourteenth Amendment question; however, each of the answers was chosen by at
least twenty percent of those surveyed. The most popular interpretation of this section of the
Fifteenth Amendment was that “any statutes that specifically prohibit persons of any race from
voting are unconstitutional.”69 This particular response, while lexically and syntactically
descriptive, results in an absolute statement. Each of the other three responses were chosen only

66

Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
68
Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
69
Banfield, “Interpretation of Legal Language Structure” (survey).
67
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by no more than twenty percent of those surveyed; however, the fact that each of the four
responses was chosen by one person, at the very least, is evidence of the linguistically
ambiguous nature of the Fifteenth Amendment.70
The last question addressed the First Amendment, specifically the right to freedom of the
press.71 This was the only question for which each answer was chose by at least twenty percent
of those surveyed, but no answer was chosen by more than forty percent of people.72 The
interpretation of the First Amendment pertaining to local legislature (that “local legislature
cannot infringe on any person’s right to the freedom of the press”) was the least chosen option, at
twenty percent.73 The other three answers were all chosen by forty percent of those surveyed.74
These results indicate that almost half of those who answered this question chose more than one
result; therefore one person was able to logically determine more than one interpretation for this
particular amendment, proving the overall linguistic ambiguity of this particular law.75
Although the statistics of the survey results are useful in determining which interpretation
seemed to be the most widespread of popular, it is not the best evidence of linguistic ambiguity.
In fact, it is the variance of answers that really proves the presence of ambiguity within the legal
language of the Constitution. No interpretation was chosen by one hundred percent of those
surveyed, and in almost all of the questions, every interpretation was chose by at least one person
who participated in the survey.76 The fact that all of these amendments and articles are
linguistically ambiguous enough to result in more than one logical interpretation is clear
evidence of linguistic ambiguity within the Constitution.
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Conclusion
Linguistic ambiguity is a major cause of the variety of interpretations of the Constitution,
as well as many other types of legal discourse. The ambiguous language of the Constitution and
its amendments is a large reason for its ability to be reviewed in a diverse number of ways;
however, it is not the only cause of variant interpretations. Over the past century, evidence such
as scientific research and empirical studies has become a factor in deciding many cases
concerning the Constitution (as shown in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka); yet as these
types of evidence influence cases of constitutionality, so do those case decisions influence
possible linguistic interpretations.77 As often as judicial views on the Constitution change, so do
the meanings of the words and phrases on which those judicial views are founded. Whether the
words, phrases, or clauses are the object of ambiguity for Supreme Court justices, no
interpretation or understanding, and therefore no opinion, will be exactly the same. The
dynamically ambiguous nature of the legal language utilized in the Constitution has been a factor
in interpretational variance, and will continue to have its influence in Supreme Court decisions
concerning constitutionality.

77
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